The product defines a large address region protected from modification by the same register lock control bit.

The CPU is not configured to provide hardware support for exclusivity of write and execute operations on memory.

Aliased or mirrored memory regions in hardware designs may have inconsistent read/write permissions enforced by the hardware.

The product allows address regions to overlap, which can result in the bypassing of intended memory protection.

The product conducts a secure-boot process that transfers bootloader code from Non-Volatile Memory (NVM) into Volatile Memory (VM), but it does not have sufficient access control or other protections for the Volatile Memory.

Immutable data, such as a first-stage bootloader, device identifiers, and "write-once" configuration settings are stored in writable memory that can be re-programmed or updated in the field.

The firewall in an on-chip fabric protects the main addressed region, but it does not protect any mirrored memory or memory-mapped-IO (MMIO) regions.

The address map of the on-chip fabric has protected and unprotected regions overlapping, allowing an attacker to bypass access control to the overlapping portion of the protected region.

A missing immutable root of trust in the hardware results in the ability to bypass secure boot or execute untrusted or adversarial boot code.