Netty is a network application framework for development of protocol servers and clients. NoQuicTokenHandler is the tokenHandler used when …
Netty is a network application framework for development of protocol servers and clients. NoQuicTokenHandler is the tokenHandler used when the application does not set one. Prior to version 4.2.15.Final, its writeToken() returns false (server will not send Retry — acceptable), but validateToken() unconditionally `return 0`. In QuicheQuicServerCodec.handlePacket(), a non-negative return from validateToken() is interpreted as 'token is valid, ODCID starts at offset 0', causing the server to call quiche_accept as if the client's address had been validated by a Retry round-trip. Per RFC 9000 §8.1, a validated address lifts the 3× anti-amplification send limit. Thus any attacker who includes ANY non-empty token bytes in an Initial packet — with a spoofed victim source IP — causes the Netty server to treat the victim as validated and reflect full-size handshake flights (certificates, etc.) toward it without the 3× cap. The correct 'no token handler' semantics would be to return -1 (invalid) so the normal un-validated path and amplification limit apply. Version 4.2.15.Final patches the issue.
The product establishes a communication channel to handle an incoming request that has been initiated by an actor, but it does not properly verify that the request is coming from the expected origin.
https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/940.html →Open in CWE collection →An adversary, through a previously installed malicious application, injects code into the context of a web page displayed by a WebView component. Through the injected code, an adversary is able to manipulate the DOM tree and cookies of the page, expose sensitive information, and can launch attacks against the web application from within the web page.
https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/500.html →Open in CAPEC collection →An adversary injects traffic into the target's network connection. The adversary is therefore able to degrade or disrupt the connection, and potentially modify the content. This is not a flooding attack, as the adversary is not focusing on exhausting resources. Instead, the adversary is crafting a specific input to affect the system in a particular way.
https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/594.html →Open in CAPEC collection →In this attack pattern, an adversary injects a connection reset packet to one or both ends of a target's connection. The attacker is therefore able to have the target and/or the destination server sever the connection without having to directly filter the traffic between them.
https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/595.html →Open in CAPEC collection →An adversary injects one or more TCP RST packets to a target after the target has made a HTTP GET request. The goal of this attack is to have the target and/or destination web server terminate the TCP connection.
https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/596.html →Open in CAPEC collection →