Apache MINA's AbstractIoBuffer.resolveClass() contains two branches, one of them (for static classes or primitive types) does not check the…
Apache MINA's AbstractIoBuffer.resolveClass() contains two branches, one of them (for static classes or primitive types) does not check the class at all, bypassing the classname allowlist and allowing arbitrary code to be executed. The fix checks if the class is present in the accepted class filter before calling Class.forName(). Affected versions are Apache MINA 2.0.0 <= 2.0.27, 2.1.0 <= 2.1.10, and 2.2.0 <= 2.2.5. The problem is resolved in Apache MINA 2.0.28, 2.1.11, and 2.2.6 by applying the classname allowlist earlier. Affected are applications using Apache MINA that call IoBuffer.getObject(). Applications using Apache MINA are advised to upgrade.
The product deserializes untrusted data without sufficiently ensuring that the resulting data will be valid.
https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/502.html →Open in CWE collection →An adversary attempts to exploit an application by injecting additional, malicious content during its processing of serialized objects. Developers leverage serialization in order to convert data or state into a static, binary format for saving to disk or transferring over a network. These objects are then deserialized when needed to recover the data/state. By injecting a malformed object into a vulnerable application, an adversary can potentially compromise the application by manipulating the deserialization process. This can result in a number of unwanted outcomes, including remote code execution.
https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/586.html →Open in CAPEC collection →