CodiMD through 2.5.4 has a CSP-based protection mechanism against XSS through uploaded SVG documents containing JavaScript, but it can be b…
CodiMD through 2.5.4 has a CSP-based protection mechanism against XSS through uploaded SVG documents containing JavaScript, but it can be bypassed in certain cases of different-origin file storage, such as AWS S3. NOTE: it can be considered a user error if AWS is employed for hosting untrusted JavaScript content, but the selected architecture within AWS does not have components that are able to insert Content-Security-Policy headers.
The product does not sufficiently protect all possible paths that a user can take to access restricted functionality or resources.
https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/424.html →Open in CWE collection →An adversary crafts a request to a target that results in the target listing/indexing the content of a directory as output. One common method of triggering directory contents as output is to construct a request containing a path that terminates in a directory name rather than a file name since many applications are configured to provide a list of the directory's contents when such a request is received. An adversary can use this to explore the directory tree on a target as well as learn the names of files. This can often end up revealing test files, backup files, temporary files, hidden files, configuration files, user accounts, script contents, as well as naming conventions, all of which can be used by an attacker to mount additional attacks.
https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/127.html →Open in CAPEC collection →An adversary attacks a system by bypassing some or all functionality intended to protect it. Often, a system user will think that protection is in place, but the functionality behind those protections has been disabled by the adversary.
https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/554.html →Open in CAPEC collection →