Weak Password Reset Rules vulnerabilities where found providing a potiential for the storage of weak passwords that could facilitate unauth…
Weak Password Reset Rules vulnerabilities where found providing a potiential for the storage of weak passwords that could facilitate unauthorized admin/application access. Affected products: ABB ASPECT - Enterprise v3.07.02; NEXUS Series v3.07.02; MATRIX Series v3.07.02
The product does not require that users should have strong passwords.
https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/521.html →Open in CWE collection →https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/16.html →Open in CAPEC collection →
An adversary tries every possible value for a password until they succeed. A brute force attack, if feasible computationally, will always be successful because it will essentially go through all possible passwords given the alphabet used (lower case letters, upper case letters, numbers, symbols, etc.) and the maximum length of the password.
https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/49.html →Open in CAPEC collection →An attacker gets access to the database table where hashes of passwords are stored. They then use a rainbow table of pre-computed hash chains to attempt to look up the original password. Once the original password corresponding to the hash is obtained, the attacker uses the original password to gain access to the system.
https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/55.html →Open in CAPEC collection →An adversary may try certain common or default usernames and passwords to gain access into the system and perform unauthorized actions. An adversary may try an intelligent brute force using empty passwords, known vendor default credentials, as well as a dictionary of common usernames and passwords. Many vendor products come preconfigured with default (and thus well-known) usernames and passwords that should be deleted prior to usage in a production environment. It is a common mistake to forget to remove these default login credentials. Another problem is that users would pick very simple (common) passwords (e.g. "secret" or "password") that make it easier for the attacker to gain access to the system compared to using a brute force attack or even a dictionary attack using a full dictionary.
https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/70.html →Open in CAPEC collection →In this attack, some asset (information, functionality, identity, etc.) is protected by a finite secret value. The attacker attempts to gain access to this asset by using trial-and-error to exhaustively explore all the possible secret values in the hope of finding the secret (or a value that is functionally equivalent) that will unlock the asset.
https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/112.html →Open in CAPEC collection →Through the exploitation of how service accounts leverage Kerberos authentication with Service Principal Names (SPNs), the adversary obtains and subsequently cracks the hashed credentials of a service account target to exploit its privileges. The Kerberos authentication protocol centers around a ticketing system which is used to request/grant access to services and to then access the requested services. As an authenticated user, the adversary may request Active Directory and obtain a service ticket with portions encrypted via RC4 with the private key of the authenticated account. By extracting the local ticket and saving it disk, the adversary can brute force the hashed value to reveal the target account credentials.
https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/509.html →Open in CAPEC collection →This pattern of attack involves an adversary that uses stolen credentials to leverage remote services such as RDP, telnet, SSH, and VNC to log into a system. Once access is gained, any number of malicious activities could be performed.
https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/555.html →Open in CAPEC collection →An adversary guesses or obtains (i.e. steals or purchases) legitimate Windows administrator credentials (e.g. userID/password) to access Windows Admin Shares on a local machine or within a Windows domain.
https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/561.html →Open in CAPEC collection →https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/565.html →Open in CAPEC collection →
| Product | Vendor | Status |
|---|---|---|
| aspect-ent-12_firmware | * | Tracked |
| aspect-ent-256_firmware | * | Tracked |
| aspect-ent-2_firmware | * | Tracked |
| aspect-ent-96_firmware | * | Tracked |
| matrix-11_firmware | * | Tracked |
| matrix-216_firmware | * | Tracked |
| matrix-232_firmware | * | Tracked |
| matrix-264_firmware | * | Tracked |
| matrix-296_firmware | * | Tracked |
| nexus-2128-a_firmware | * | Tracked |
| nexus-2128-f_firmware | * | Tracked |
| nexus-2128-g_firmware | * | Tracked |
| nexus-2128_firmware | * | Tracked |
| nexus-264-a_firmware | * | Tracked |
| nexus-264-f_firmware | * | Tracked |
| nexus-264-g_firmware | * | Tracked |
| nexus-264_firmware | * | Tracked |
| nexus-3-2128_firmware | * | Tracked |
| nexus-3-264_firmware | * | Tracked |