An Improper Restriction of Communication Channel to Intended Endpoints vulnerability in the timescaledb feature of Juniper Networks Paragon…
An Improper Restriction of Communication Channel to Intended Endpoints vulnerability in the timescaledb feature of Juniper Networks Paragon Active Assurance (PAA) (Formerly Netrounds) allows an attacker to bypass existing firewall rules and limitations used to restrict internal communcations. The Test Agents (TA) Appliance connects to the Control Center (CC) using OpenVPN. TA's are assigned an internal IP address in the 100.70.0.0/16 range. Firewall rules exists to limit communication from TA's to the CC to specific services only. OpenVPN is configured to not allow direct communication between Test Agents in the OpenVPN application itself, and routing is normally not enabled on the server running the CC application. The timescaledb feature is installed as an optional package on the Control Center. When the timescaledb container is started, this causes side-effects by bypassing the existing firewall rules and limitations for Test Agent communications. Note: This issue only affects customers hosting their own on-prem Control Center. The Paragon Active Assurance Software as a Service (SaaS) is not affected by this vulnerability since the timescaledb service is not enabled. This issue affects all on-prem versions of Juniper Networks Paragon Active Assurance prior to 4.1.2.
The product establishes a communication channel to (or from) an endpoint for privileged or protected operations, but it does not properly ensure that it is communicating with the correct endpoint.
https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/923.html →Open in CWE collection →An attacker exploits characteristics of the infrastructure of a network entity in order to perpetrate attacks or information gathering on network objects or effect a change in the ordinary information flow between network objects. Most often, this involves manipulation of the routing of network messages so, instead of arriving at their proper destination, they are directed towards an entity of the attackers' choosing, usually a server controlled by the attacker. The victim is often unaware that their messages are not being processed correctly. For example, a targeted client may believe they are connecting to their own bank but, in fact, be connecting to a Pharming site controlled by the attacker which then collects the user's login information in order to hijack the actual bank account.
https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/161.html →Open in CAPEC collection →Adversaries can provide contradictory destinations when sending messages. Traffic is routed in networks using the domain names in various headers available at different levels of the OSI model. In a Content Delivery Network (CDN) multiple domains might be available, and if there are contradictory domain names provided it is possible to route traffic to an inappropriate destination. The technique, called Domain Fronting, involves using different domain names in the SNI field of the TLS header and the Host field of the HTTP header. An alternative technique, called Domainless Fronting, is similar, but the SNI field is left blank.
https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/481.html →Open in CAPEC collection →An adversary intercepts an implicit intent sent to launch a Android-based trusted activity and instead launches a counterfeit activity in its place. The malicious activity is then used to mimic the trusted activity's user interface and prompt the target to enter sensitive data as if they were interacting with the trusted activity.
https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/501.html →Open in CAPEC collection →https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/697.html →Open in CAPEC collection →
| Product | Vendor | Status |
|---|---|---|
| paragon_active_assurance | * | Tracked |