Play Framework is a web framework for Java and Scala. Verions prior to 2.8.16 are vulnerable to generation of error messages containing sen…
Play Framework is a web framework for Java and Scala. Verions prior to 2.8.16 are vulnerable to generation of error messages containing sensitive information. Play Framework, when run in dev mode, shows verbose errors for easy debugging, including an exception stack trace. Play does this by configuring its `DefaultHttpErrorHandler` to do so based on the application mode. In its Scala API Play also provides a static object `DefaultHttpErrorHandler` that is configured to always show verbose errors. This is used as a default value in some Play APIs, so it is possible to inadvertently use this version in production. It is also possible to improperly configure the `DefaultHttpErrorHandler` object instance as the injected error handler. Both of these situations could result in verbose errors displaying to users in a production application, which could expose sensitive information from the application. In particular, the constructor for `CORSFilter` and `apply` method for `CORSActionBuilder` use the static object `DefaultHttpErrorHandler` as a default value. This is patched in Play Framework 2.8.16. The `DefaultHttpErrorHandler` object has been changed to use the prod-mode behavior, and `DevHttpErrorHandler` has been introduced for the dev-mode behavior. A workaround is available. When constructing a `CORSFilter` or `CORSActionBuilder`, ensure that a properly-configured error handler is passed. Generally this should be done by using the `HttpErrorHandler` instance provided through dependency injection or through Play's `BuiltInComponents`. Ensure that the application is not using the `DefaultHttpErrorHandler` static object in any code that may be run in production.
The product generates an error message that includes sensitive information about its environment, users, or associated data.
https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/209.html →Open in CWE collection →Blind SQL Injection results from an insufficient mitigation for SQL Injection. Although suppressing database error messages are considered best practice, the suppression alone is not sufficient to prevent SQL Injection. Blind SQL Injection is a form of SQL Injection that overcomes the lack of error messages. Without the error messages that facilitate SQL Injection, the adversary constructs input strings that probe the target through simple Boolean SQL expressions. The adversary can determine if the syntax and structure of the injection was successful based on whether the query was executed or not. Applied iteratively, the adversary determines how and where the target is vulnerable to SQL Injection.
https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/7.html →Open in CAPEC collection →An adversary, aware of an application's location (and possibly authorized to use the application), probes an application's structure and evaluates its robustness by submitting requests and examining responses. Often, this is accomplished by sending variants of expected queries in the hope that these modified queries might return information beyond what the expected set of queries would provide.
https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/54.html →Open in CAPEC collection →An attacker sends random, malformed, or otherwise unexpected messages to a target application and observes the application's log or error messages returned. The attacker does not initially know how a target will respond to individual messages but by attempting a large number of message variants they may find a variant that trigger's desired behavior. In this attack, the purpose of the fuzzing is to observe the application's log and error messages, although fuzzing a target can also sometimes cause the target to enter an unstable state, causing a crash.
https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/215.html →Open in CAPEC collection →An adversary is able to efficiently decrypt data without knowing the decryption key if a target system leaks data on whether or not a padding error happened while decrypting the ciphertext. A target system that leaks this type of information becomes the padding oracle and an adversary is able to make use of that oracle to efficiently decrypt data without knowing the decryption key by issuing on average 128*b calls to the padding oracle (where b is the number of bytes in the ciphertext block). In addition to performing decryption, an adversary is also able to produce valid ciphertexts (i.e., perform encryption) by using the padding oracle, all without knowing the encryption key.
https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/463.html →Open in CAPEC collection →