In Spring Cloud Function versions 3.1.6, 3.2.2 and older unsupported versions, when using routing functionality it is possible for a user t…
In Spring Cloud Function versions 3.1.6, 3.2.2 and older unsupported versions, when using routing functionality it is possible for a user to provide a specially crafted SpEL as a routing-expression that may result in remote code execution and access to local resources.
The product constructs all or part of a code segment using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the syntax or behavior of the intended code segment.
https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/94.html →Open in CWE collection →An attack of this type exploits a system's trust in configuration and resource files. When the executable loads the resource (such as an image file or configuration file) the attacker has modified the file to either execute malicious code directly or manipulate the target process (e.g. application server) to execute based on the malicious configuration parameters. Since systems are increasingly interrelated mashing up resources from local and remote sources the possibility of this attack occurring is high.
https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/35.html →Open in CAPEC collection →This attack targets user controlled variables (DEBUG=1, PHP Globals, and So Forth). An adversary can override variables leveraging user-supplied, untrusted query variables directly used on the application server without any data sanitization. In extreme cases, the adversary can change variables controlling the business logic of the application. For instance, in languages like PHP, a number of poorly set default configurations may allow the user to override variables.
https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/77.html →Open in CAPEC collection →An adversary exploits a weakness in input validation on the target to inject new code into that which is currently executing. This differs from code inclusion in that code inclusion involves the addition or replacement of a reference to a code file, which is subsequently loaded by the target and used as part of the code of some application.
https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/242.html →Open in CAPEC collection →| Product | Vendor | Status |
|---|---|---|
| openshift-serverless-clients | Exploited | |
| banking_branch | * | Exploited |
| banking_cash_management | * | Exploited |
| banking_corporate_lending_process_management | * | Exploited |
| banking_credit_facilities_process_management | * | Exploited |
| banking_electronic_data_exchange_for_corporates | * | Exploited |
| banking_liquidity_management | * | Exploited |
| banking_origination | * | Exploited |
| banking_supply_chain_finance | * | Exploited |
| banking_trade_finance_process_management | * | Exploited |
| banking_virtual_account_management | * | Exploited |
| communications_cloud_native_core_automated_test_suite | * | Exploited |
| communications_cloud_native_core_console | * | Exploited |
| communications_cloud_native_core_network_exposure_function | * | Exploited |
| communications_cloud_native_core_network_function_cloud_native_environment | * | Exploited |
| communications_cloud_native_core_network_repository_function | * | Exploited |
| communications_cloud_native_core_network_slice_selection_function | * | Exploited |
| communications_cloud_native_core_policy | * | Exploited |
| communications_cloud_native_core_security_edge_protection_proxy | * | Exploited |
| communications_cloud_native_core_unified_data_repository | * | Exploited |