Pi-hole 5.0, 5.1, and 5.1.1 allows Session Fixation. The application does not generate a new session cookie after the user is logged in. A …
Pi-hole 5.0, 5.1, and 5.1.1 allows Session Fixation. The application does not generate a new session cookie after the user is logged in. A malicious user is able to create a new session cookie value and inject it to a victim. After the victim logs in, the injected cookie becomes valid, giving the attacker access to the user's account through the active session.
Authenticating a user, or otherwise establishing a new user session, without invalidating any existing session identifier gives an attacker the opportunity to steal authenticated sessions.
https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/384.html →Open in CWE collection →https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/21.html →Open in CAPEC collection →
This attack relies on the use of HTTP Cookies to store credentials, state information and other critical data on client systems. There are several different forms of this attack. The first form of this attack involves accessing HTTP Cookies to mine for potentially sensitive data contained therein. The second form involves intercepting this data as it is transmitted from client to server. This intercepted information is then used by the adversary to impersonate the remote user/session. The third form is when the cookie's content is modified by the adversary before it is sent back to the server. Here the adversary seeks to convince the target server to operate on this falsified information.
https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/31.html →Open in CAPEC collection →In circumstances where an application holds important data client-side in tokens (cookies, URLs, data files, and so forth) that data can be manipulated. If client or server-side application components reinterpret that data as authentication tokens or data (such as store item pricing or wallet information) then even opaquely manipulating that data may bear fruit for an Attacker. In this pattern an attacker undermines the assumption that client side tokens have been adequately protected from tampering through use of encryption or obfuscation.
https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/39.html →Open in CAPEC collection →This attack targets predictable session ID in order to gain privileges. The attacker can predict the session ID used during a transaction to perform spoofing and session hijacking.
https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/59.html →Open in CAPEC collection →This attack targets the reuse of valid session ID to spoof the target system in order to gain privileges. The attacker tries to reuse a stolen session ID used previously during a transaction to perform spoofing and session hijacking. Another name for this type of attack is Session Replay.
https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/60.html →Open in CAPEC collection →The attacker induces a client to establish a session with the target software using a session identifier provided by the attacker. Once the user successfully authenticates to the target software, the attacker uses the (now privileged) session identifier in their own transactions. This attack leverages the fact that the target software either relies on client-generated session identifiers or maintains the same session identifiers after privilege elevation.
https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/61.html →Open in CAPEC collection →An attacker creates a false but functional session credential in order to gain or usurp access to a service. Session credentials allow users to identify themselves to a service after an initial authentication without needing to resend the authentication information (usually a username and password) with every message. If an attacker is able to forge valid session credentials they may be able to bypass authentication or piggy-back off some other authenticated user's session. This attack differs from Reuse of Session IDs and Session Sidejacking attacks in that in the latter attacks an attacker uses a previous or existing credential without modification while, in a forging attack, the attacker must create their own credential, although it may be based on previously observed credentials.
https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/196.html →Open in CAPEC collection →