A message-forgery issue was discovered in crypto/openpgp/clearsign/clearsign.go in supplementary Go cryptography libraries 2019-03-25. Acco…
A message-forgery issue was discovered in crypto/openpgp/clearsign/clearsign.go in supplementary Go cryptography libraries 2019-03-25. According to the OpenPGP Message Format specification in RFC 4880 chapter 7, a cleartext signed message can contain one or more optional "Hash" Armor Headers. The "Hash" Armor Header specifies the message digest algorithm(s) used for the signature. However, the Go clearsign package ignores the value of this header, which allows an attacker to spoof it. Consequently, an attacker can lead a victim to believe the signature was generated using a different message digest algorithm than what was actually used. Moreover, since the library skips Armor Header parsing in general, an attacker can not only embed arbitrary Armor Headers, but also prepend arbitrary text to cleartext messages without invalidating the signatures.
The product does not verify, or incorrectly verifies, the cryptographic signature for data.
https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/347.html →Open in CWE collection →An adversary is able to efficiently decrypt data without knowing the decryption key if a target system leaks data on whether or not a padding error happened while decrypting the ciphertext. A target system that leaks this type of information becomes the padding oracle and an adversary is able to make use of that oracle to efficiently decrypt data without knowing the decryption key by issuing on average 128*b calls to the padding oracle (where b is the number of bytes in the ciphertext block). In addition to performing decryption, an adversary is also able to produce valid ciphertexts (i.e., perform encryption) by using the padding oracle, all without knowing the encryption key.
https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/463.html →Open in CAPEC collection →An adversary exploits a cryptographic weakness in the signature verification algorithm implementation to generate a valid signature without knowing the key.
https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/475.html →Open in CAPEC collection →| Product | Vendor | Status |
|---|---|---|
| golang-go.crypto | Tracked | |
| golang-go.crypto | Tracked | |
| golang-go.crypto | Tracked | |
| golang-go.crypto | Tracked | |
| golang-go.crypto | Tracked | |
| golang-go.crypto | Tracked | |
| golang-go.crypto | Tracked | |
| golang-go.crypto | Tracked | |
| golang-go.crypto | Tracked | |
| golang-go.crypto | Tracked | |
| golang-go.crypto | Tracked | |
| golang-go.crypto | Tracked | |
| golang-go.crypto | Tracked | |
| golang-go.crypto | Tracked | |
| golang-go.crypto | Tracked | |
| golang-go.crypto | Tracked | |
| golang-go.crypto | Tracked | |
| golang-go.crypto | Tracked | |
| snapd | Tracked | |
| snapd | Tracked |