Apache Karaf provides a features deployer, which allows users to "hot deploy" a features XML by dropping the file directly in the deploy fo…
Apache Karaf provides a features deployer, which allows users to "hot deploy" a features XML by dropping the file directly in the deploy folder. The features XML is parsed by XMLInputFactory class. Apache Karaf XMLInputFactory class doesn't contain any mitigation codes against XXE. This is a potential security risk as an user can inject external XML entities in Apache Karaf version prior to 4.1.7 or 4.2.2. It has been fixed in Apache Karaf 4.1.7 and 4.2.2 releases.
The product processes an XML document that can contain XML entities with URIs that resolve to documents outside of the intended sphere of control, causing the product to embed incorrect documents into its output.
https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/611.html →Open in CWE collection →This attack takes advantage of the entity replacement property of certain data serialization languages (e.g., XML, YAML, etc.) where the value of the replacement is a URI. A well-crafted file could have the entity refer to a URI that consumes a large amount of resources to create a denial of service condition. This can cause the system to either freeze, crash, or execute arbitrary code depending on the URI.
https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/221.html →Open in CAPEC collection →| Product | Vendor | Status |
|---|---|---|
| apache-karaf | Tracked | |
| karaf | * | Tracked |