It was found that the GnuTLS implementation of HMAC-SHA-256 was vulnerable to a Lucky thirteen style attack. Remote attackers could use thi…
It was found that the GnuTLS implementation of HMAC-SHA-256 was vulnerable to a Lucky thirteen style attack. Remote attackers could use this flaw to conduct distinguishing attacks and plaintext-recovery attacks via statistical analysis of timing data using crafted packets.
The product uses a broken or risky cryptographic algorithm or protocol.
https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/327.html →Open in CWE collection →Covert timing channels convey information by modulating some aspect of system behavior over time, so that the program receiving the information can observe system behavior and infer protected information.
https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/385.html →Open in CWE collection →An attacker, armed with the cipher text and the encryption algorithm used, performs an exhaustive (brute force) search on the key space to determine the key that decrypts the cipher text to obtain the plaintext.
https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/20.html →Open in CAPEC collection →Cryptanalysis is a process of finding weaknesses in cryptographic algorithms and using these weaknesses to decipher the ciphertext without knowing the secret key (instance deduction). Sometimes the weakness is not in the cryptographic algorithm itself, but rather in how it is applied that makes cryptanalysis successful. An attacker may have other goals as well, such as: Total Break (finding the secret key), Global Deduction (finding a functionally equivalent algorithm for encryption and decryption that does not require knowledge of the secret key), Information Deduction (gaining some information about plaintexts or ciphertexts that was not previously known) and Distinguishing Algorithm (the attacker has the ability to distinguish the output of the encryption (ciphertext) from a random permutation of bits).
https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/97.html →Open in CAPEC collection →An adversary exploits a weakness resulting from using a hashing algorithm with weak collision resistance to generate certificate signing requests (CSR) that contain collision blocks in their "to be signed" parts. The adversary submits one CSR to be signed by a trusted certificate authority then uses the signed blob to make a second certificate appear signed by said certificate authority. Due to the hash collision, both certificates, though different, hash to the same value and so the signed blob works just as well in the second certificate. The net effect is that the adversary's second X.509 certificate, which the Certification Authority has never seen, is now signed and validated by that Certification Authority.
https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/459.html →Open in CAPEC collection →An attacker initiates cross domain HTTP / GET requests and times the server responses. The timing of these responses may leak important information on what is happening on the server. Browser's same origin policy prevents the attacker from directly reading the server responses (in the absence of any other weaknesses), but does not prevent the attacker from timing the responses to requests that the attacker issued cross domain.
https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/462.html →Open in CAPEC collection →An attacker generates a message or datablock that causes the recipient to believe that the message or datablock was generated and cryptographically signed by an authoritative or reputable source, misleading a victim or victim operating system into performing malicious actions.
https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/473.html →Open in CAPEC collection →An adversary exploits a cryptographic weakness in the signature verification algorithm implementation to generate a valid signature without knowing the key.
https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/475.html →Open in CAPEC collection →The use of cryptanalytic techniques to derive cryptographic keys or otherwise effectively defeat cellular encryption to reveal traffic content. Some cellular encryption algorithms such as A5/1 and A5/2 (specified for GSM use) are known to be vulnerable to such attacks and commercial tools are available to execute these attacks and decrypt mobile phone conversations in real-time. Newer encryption algorithms in use by UMTS and LTE are stronger and currently believed to be less vulnerable to these types of attacks. Note, however, that an attacker with a Cellular Rogue Base Station can force the use of weak cellular encryption even by newer mobile devices.
https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/608.html →Open in CAPEC collection →SIM cards are the de facto trust anchor of mobile devices worldwide. The cards protect the mobile identity of subscribers, associate devices with phone numbers, and increasingly store payment credentials, for example in NFC-enabled phones with mobile wallets. This attack leverages over-the-air (OTA) updates deployed via cryptographically-secured SMS messages to deliver executable code to the SIM. By cracking the DES key, an attacker can send properly signed binary SMS messages to a device, which are treated as Java applets and are executed on the SIM. These applets are allowed to send SMS, change voicemail numbers, and query the phone location, among many other predefined functions. These capabilities alone provide plenty of potential for abuse.
https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/614.html →Open in CAPEC collection →| Product | Vendor | Status |
|---|---|---|
| gnutls | Tracked | |
| gnutls26 | Tracked | |
| gnutls26 | Tracked | |
| gnutls28 | Tracked | |
| gnutls28 | Tracked | |
| gnutls28 | Tracked | |
| gnutls28 | Tracked | |
| gnutls28 | Tracked | |
| gnutls28 | Tracked | |
| gnutls28 | Tracked | |
| gnutls28 | Tracked | |
| gnutls28 | Tracked | |
| gnutls28 | Tracked | |
| gnutls28 | Tracked | |
| gnutls28 | Tracked | |
| gnutls28 | Tracked | |
| gnutls28 | Tracked | |
| gnutls28 | Tracked | |
| gnutls28 | Tracked | |
| gnutls28 | Tracked |