bcrypt password hashing in Botan before 2.1.0 does not correctly handle passwords with a length between 57 and 72 characters, which makes i…
bcrypt password hashing in Botan before 2.1.0 does not correctly handle passwords with a length between 57 and 72 characters, which makes it easier for attackers to determine the cleartext password.
The product transmits sensitive or security-critical data in cleartext in a communication channel that can be sniffed by unauthorized actors.
https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/319.html →Open in CWE collection →An adversary passively sniffs network communications and captures application code bound for an authorized client. Once obtained, they can use it as-is, or through reverse-engineering glean sensitive information or exploit the trust relationship between the client and server. Such code may belong to a dynamic update to the client, a patch being applied to a client component or any such interaction where the client is authorized to communicate with the server.
https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/65.html →Open in CAPEC collection →Session sidejacking takes advantage of an unencrypted communication channel between a victim and target system. The attacker sniffs traffic on a network looking for session tokens in unencrypted traffic. Once a session token is captured, the attacker performs malicious actions by using the stolen token with the targeted application to impersonate the victim. This attack is a specific method of session hijacking, which is exploiting a valid session token to gain unauthorized access to a target system or information. Other methods to perform a session hijacking are session fixation, cross-site scripting, or compromising a user or server machine and stealing the session token.
https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/102.html →Open in CAPEC collection →An adversary monitors data streams to or from the target for information gathering purposes. This attack may be undertaken to solely gather sensitive information or to support a further attack against the target. This attack pattern can involve sniffing network traffic as well as other types of data streams (e.g. radio). The adversary can attempt to initiate the establishment of a data stream or passively observe the communications as they unfold. In all variants of this attack, the adversary is not the intended recipient of the data stream. In contrast to other means of gathering information (e.g., targeting data leaks), the adversary must actively position themself so as to observe explicit data channels (e.g. network traffic) and read the content. However, this attack differs from a Adversary-In-the-Middle (CAPEC-94) attack, as the adversary does not alter the content of the communications nor forward data to the intended recipient.
https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/117.html →Open in CAPEC collection →An adversary hosts an event within an application framework and then monitors the data exchanged during the course of the event for the purpose of harvesting any important data leaked during the transactions. One example could be harvesting lists of usernames or userIDs for the purpose of sending spam messages to those users. One example of this type of attack involves the adversary creating an event within the sub-application. Assume the adversary hosts a "virtual sale" of rare items. As other users enter the event, the attacker records via AiTM (CAPEC-94) proxy the user_ids and usernames of everyone who attends. The adversary would then be able to spam those users within the application using an automated script.
https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/383.html →Open in CAPEC collection →An attacker exploits the underlying complexity of a data structure that allows for both signed and unsigned content, to cause unsigned data to be processed as though it were signed data.
https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/477.html →Open in CAPEC collection →