The web interface on the snom VoIP phones snom 300, snom 320, snom 360, snom 370, and snom 820 with firmware 6.5 before 6.5.20, 7.1 before …
The web interface on the snom VoIP phones snom 300, snom 320, snom 360, snom 370, and snom 820 with firmware 6.5 before 6.5.20, 7.1 before 7.1.39, and 7.3 before 7.3.14 allows remote attackers to bypass authentication, and reconfigure the phone or make arbitrary use of the phone, via a (1) http or (2) https request with 127.0.0.1 in the Host header.
This attack-focused weakness is caused by incorrectly implemented authentication schemes that are subject to spoofing attacks.
https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/290.html →Open in CWE collection →https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/21.html →Open in CAPEC collection →
An attack of this type exploits vulnerabilities in client/server communication channel authentication and data integrity. It leverages the implicit trust a server places in the client, or more importantly, that which the server believes is the client. An attacker executes this type of attack by communicating directly with the server where the server believes it is communicating only with a valid client. There are numerous variations of this type of attack.
https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/22.html →Open in CAPEC collection →This attack targets predictable session ID in order to gain privileges. The attacker can predict the session ID used during a transaction to perform spoofing and session hijacking.
https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/59.html →Open in CAPEC collection →This attack targets the reuse of valid session ID to spoof the target system in order to gain privileges. The attacker tries to reuse a stolen session ID used previously during a transaction to perform spoofing and session hijacking. Another name for this type of attack is Session Replay.
https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/60.html →Open in CAPEC collection →https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/94.html →Open in CAPEC collection →
An adversary exploits a weakness resulting from using a hashing algorithm with weak collision resistance to generate certificate signing requests (CSR) that contain collision blocks in their "to be signed" parts. The adversary submits one CSR to be signed by a trusted certificate authority then uses the signed blob to make a second certificate appear signed by said certificate authority. Due to the hash collision, both certificates, though different, hash to the same value and so the signed blob works just as well in the second certificate. The net effect is that the adversary's second X.509 certificate, which the Certification Authority has never seen, is now signed and validated by that Certification Authority.
https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/459.html →Open in CAPEC collection →An adversary utilizes a hash function extension/padding weakness, to modify the parameters passed to the web service requesting authentication by generating their own call in order to generate a legitimate signature hash (as described in the notes), without knowledge of the secret token sometimes provided by the web service.
https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/461.html →Open in CAPEC collection →An attacker generates a message or datablock that causes the recipient to believe that the message or datablock was generated and cryptographically signed by an authoritative or reputable source, misleading a victim or victim operating system into performing malicious actions.
https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/473.html →Open in CAPEC collection →An attacker exploits a weakness in the parsing or display code of the recipient software to generate a data blob containing a supposedly valid signature, but the signer's identity is falsely represented, which can lead to the attacker manipulating the recipient software or its victim user to perform compromising actions.
https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/476.html →Open in CAPEC collection →An adversary disguises the MAC address of their Bluetooth enabled device to one for which there exists an active and trusted connection and authenticates successfully. The adversary can then perform malicious actions on the target Bluetooth device depending on the target’s capabilities.
https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/667.html →Open in CAPEC collection →| Product | Vendor | Status |
|---|---|---|
| snom_300_firmware | * | Tracked |
| snom_320_firmware | * | Tracked |
| snom_360_firmware | * | Tracked |
| snom_370_firmware | * | Tracked |
| snom_820_firmware | * | Tracked |