The Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement Protocol allows remote attackers (from the client side) to send arbitrary numbers that are actually not pu…
The Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement Protocol allows remote attackers (from the client side) to send arbitrary numbers that are actually not public keys, and trigger expensive server-side DHE modular-exponentiation calculations, aka a D(HE)at or D(HE)ater attack. The client needs very little CPU resources and network bandwidth. The attack may be more disruptive in cases where a client can require a server to select its largest supported key size. The basic attack scenario is that the client must claim that it can only communicate with DHE, and the server must be configured to allow DHE.
The product does not properly control the allocation and maintenance of a limited resource.
https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/400.html →Open in CWE collection →An attacker initiates a resource depletion attack where a large number of small XML messages are delivered at a sufficiently rapid rate to cause a denial of service or crash of the target. Transactions such as repetitive SOAP transactions can deplete resources faster than a simple flooding attack because of the additional resources used by the SOAP protocol and the resources necessary to process SOAP messages. The transactions used are immaterial as long as they cause resource utilization on the target. In other words, this is a normal flooding attack augmented by using messages that will require extra processing on the target.
https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/147.html →Open in CAPEC collection →An adversary attempts to deny legitimate users access to a resource by continually engaging a specific resource in an attempt to keep the resource tied up as long as possible. The adversary's primary goal is not to crash or flood the target, which would alert defenders; rather it is to repeatedly perform actions or abuse algorithmic flaws such that a given resource is tied up and not available to a legitimate user. By carefully crafting a requests that keep the resource engaged through what is seemingly benign requests, legitimate users are limited or completely denied access to the resource.
https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/227.html →Open in CAPEC collection →An adversary may execute an attack on a program that uses a poor Regular Expression(Regex) implementation by choosing input that results in an extreme situation for the Regex. A typical extreme situation operates at exponential time compared to the input size. This is due to most implementations using a Nondeterministic Finite Automaton(NFA) state machine to be built by the Regex algorithm since NFA allows backtracking and thus more complex regular expressions.
https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/492.html →Open in CAPEC collection →| Product | Vendor | Status |
|---|---|---|
| arubaos-cx | * | Tracked |
| big-ip_access_policy_manager | * | Tracked |
| big-ip_advanced_firewall_manager | * | Tracked |
| big-ip_advanced_web_application_firewall | * | Tracked |
| big-ip_analytics | * | Tracked |
| big-ip_application_acceleration_manager | * | Tracked |
| big-ip_application_security_manager | * | Tracked |
| big-ip_application_visibility_and_reporting | * | Tracked |
| big-ip_carrier-grade_nat | * | Tracked |
| big-ip_ddos_hybrid_defender | * | Tracked |
| big-ip_domain_name_system | * | Tracked |
| big-ip_edge_gateway | * | Tracked |
| big-ip_fraud_protection_service | * | Tracked |
| big-ip_global_traffic_manager | * | Tracked |
| big-ip_link_controller | * | Tracked |
| big-ip_local_traffic_manager | * | Tracked |
| big-ip_policy_enforcement_manager | * | Tracked |
| big-ip_service_proxy | * | Tracked |
| big-ip_ssl_orchestrator | * | Tracked |
| big-ip_webaccelerator | * | Tracked |